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Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now possible to generate highly-
detailed genotypes inexpensively. The collection and analysis of such data has the potential to support
various applications, including personalized medical services. While the benefits of the genomics revolution
are trumpeted by the biomedical community, the increased availability of such data has major implications
for personal privacy; notably because the genome has certain essential features, which include (but are not
limited to) (i) an association with traits and certain diseases, (ii) identification capability (e.g., forensics), and
(iii) revelation of family relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the likelihood
that genome data will be made available in less regulated environments, such as the Internet and for-profit
companies. The problem of genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer science, medicine,
and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed data privacy for various data types, there has
been less attention dedicated to genomic data. Thus, the goal of this paper is to provide a systematization of
knowledge for the computer science community. In doing so, we address some of the (sometimes erroneous)
beliefs of this field and we report on a survey we conducted about genome data privacy with biomedical
specialists. Then, after characterizing the genome privacy problem, we review the state-of-the-art regarding
privacy attacks on genomic data and strategies for mitigating such attacks, as well as contextualizing these
attacks from the perspective of medicine and public policy. This paper concludes with an enumeration of the
challenges for genome data privacy and presents a framework to systematize the analysis of threats and the
design of countermeasures as the field moves forward.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The genomic era began with the announcement 12 years ago that the Human Genome
Project (HGP) had completed its goals [Guttmacher and Collins 2003]. The technology
associated with genome sequencing has progressed at a rapid pace, which has coincided
with the rise of cheap computing and communication technologies. Consequentially, it
is now possible to collect, store, process, and share genomic data in a manner that
was unthinkable at the advent of the HGP. In parallel with this trend, there has
been significant progress on understanding and using genomic data that fuels a rising
hunger to broaden the number of individuals who make use of their genomes and
to support research to expand the ways in which genomes can be used. This rise in
the availability and use of genomic data has led to many concerns about its security
and privacy. These concerns have been addressed with efforts to provide technical
protections and a corresponding series of demonstrations of vulnerabilities. Given that
much more research is needed and expected in this area, this seems like a good point
to overview and systematize what has been done in the last decade and provide ideas
on a framework to aid future efforts.
To provide context, consider that it was not until the early 1990s when sequencing the
human genome was posited as a scientific endeavor. The first attempt for whole genome
sequencing1 (a laboratory process that maps the full DNA sequence of an individual’s
genome) was initiated at the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1990 and
the first full sequence was released 13 years later at a total cost of $3 billion. Yet,
sequencing technology has evolved and costs have plummeted, such that the price for
a whole genome sequence is $5K2 as of July 2014 and can be completed in two to three
days. The “$1K genome in 1 day” will soon be a reality.
Decreases in sequencing costs have coincided with an escalation in genomics as a
research discipline with explicit application possibilities. Genomic data is increasingly
incorporated in a variety of domains, including health care (e.g., personalizedmedicine),
biomedical research (e.g., discovery of novel genome–phenome associations), direct-to-
consumer (DTC) services (e.g., disease risk tests), and forensics (e.g., criminal investiga-
tions). For example, it is now possible for physicians to prescribe the “right drug at the
right time” (for certain drugs) according to themakeup of their patients’ genome [Bielin-
ski et al. 2014; Overby et al. 2010; Gottesman et al. 2013b; Pulley et al. 2012].
To some people, genomic data is considered (and treated) no differently than tradi-
tional health data (such as what might be recorded in one’s medical record) or any other
type of data more generally [Bains 2010; Rothstein 2005]. While genomic data may not
be “exceptional” in its own right, it has many features that distinguish it (discussed in
1In this study, we refer to the process of obtaining the Whole Genome Sequence (WGS) or the Whole Exome
Sequence (WES) as sequencing and the process of obtaining the variants (usually only single-nucleotide
polymorphisms, or SNPs) as genotyping.
2http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts/.
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depth in the following section) and there is a common belief that it should be handled
(e.g., stored, processed, and managed) with care. The privacy issues associated with
genomic data are complex, particularly because such data has a wide range of uses and
provides information onmore than just the individual fromwhich the data was derived.
Yet, perhaps most important, there is a great fear of the unknown. Every day, we learn
something new about the genome, whether it be knowledge of a new association with
a particular disease or proof against a previously reported association. We have yet to
discover everything there is from DNA, which makes it almost impossible to assign
exact value, and thus manage DNA as a personal asset (or public good). Therefore, as
the field of genomics evolves, so too will the views on the privacy sensitivity of genomic
data. As this article progresses, we review some of the common beliefs revolving around
genome privacy. In doing so, we report on the results of a survey we conducted with
biomedical specialists regarding their perspective on genome data-privacy issues.
It should be recognized that there exist numerous publications on technical, ethical,
and legal aspects of genomics and privacy. The research in the field covers privacy-
preserving handling of genomic data in various environments (as will be reviewed in
this article). Yet, there are several challenges to ensuring that genomics and privacy
walk hand-in-hand. One of the challenges that computer scientists face is that these
views tend to be focused on one aspect of the problem in a certain setting with a certain
discipline’s perspective. From the perspective of computer science, there is a need for a
complete framework that shows (i) what type of security and privacy requirements are
needed in each step of the handling of genomic data, (ii) a characterization of the various
threat models that are realized at each step, and (iii) open computational research
problems. By providing such a framework in this article, we are able to illustrate the
important problems of genome privacy to computer science researchers working on
security and privacy problems more generally.
Related Surveys and Articles. Privacy issues caused by forensic, medical, and other
uses of genomic data have been studied in the past few years [Stajano et al. 2008;
Stajano 2009; Malin 2005a; Ayday et al. 2013a; Naveed 2014; De Cristofaro 2014a]. A
recent survey [Erlich and Narayanan 2013] discusses privacy breaches using genomic
data and proposes methods for protection. It addresses topics that we discuss in Sec-
tions 6 and Section 9 of this article. In Section 9, we present an end-to-end picture for
the handling of genomic data in a variety of contexts as shown in Figure 9, while [Erlich
and Narayanan 2013] discusses how access control, data anonymization and crypto-
graphic techniques can be used to prevent genetic privacy breaches. Moreover, Erlich
and Narayanan [2013] has been written for a general audience, whereas this article is
meant for computer scientists (and in particular security and privacy specialists).
Contributions. Following are the main contributions of this article:
—We provide an extensive and up-to-date (as of June 2015) literature survey3 of com-
puter science as well as medical literature about genome privacy.
—We report concerns expressed by an opportunistically ascertained group of biomedical
specialists about the security and privacy of genomic data.
—We develop an end-to-end framework for the security and privacy of genomic data in
a variety of health care, biomedical research, legal and forensics, and DTC contexts.
—We present what we believe to be the first document that reflects the opinions of
computer science, medical, and legal researchers for this important topic.
3In this article, the word “survey” is used to mean literature survey as well as opinion poll; however, the
meaning will be clear from the context.
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Fig. 1. Properties of DNA that, in combination, may distinguish it from other data types. Health/Behavior
means that DNA contains information about an individual’s health and behavior. Static (Traceable) means
that DNA does not change much over time in an individual. Unique means that the DNA of any two
individuals can be easily distinguished from one another. Mystique refers to the public perception of mystery
about DNA. Value refers to the importance of information content in DNA and that this importance does not
decline with time (which is the case with other medical data e.g., blood pressure, glucose level, or a blood
test). In fact, this importance will likely increase with time. Kinship means that DNA contains information
about an individual’s blood relatives.
We also provide an online tutorial4 of biology and other related material to define
technical terms used in this and other papers on the security and privacy of genomic
data. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 explains to what ex-
tent genomic data is distinct from data in general and health information in particular.
Section 3 provides an overview of uses of genomic data for the nonspecialist. Section 4
emphasizes the relevance of genome privacy. Section 5 reports on the concerns of 61 op-
portunistically ascertained biomedical scientists regarding the importance of genomic
data privacy and security. Sections 6 and 7 provide literature surveys, in which the
former summarizes the problem (i.e., the privacy risk) and the latter summarizes pos-
sible solutions. Section 8 summarizes the challenges for genomic medicine and privacy.
Based on this analysis, Section 9 offers a general framework for privacy-preserving
handling of genomic data, including an extensive threat model that discusses what
type of attacks are possible at each step of the dataflow.
2. SPECIAL FEATURES OF GENOMIC DATA
In this section, we discuss why genomic data is special. We have identified six features
of genomic data, as shown in Figure 1. While other data harbor some of these features,
we are not aware of any data (including other molecular, such as proteomics, data) that
have all of these features.
Consider the following scenario. Alice decides to have her genome sequenced by a
service called MyGenome.com that keeps her data in a repository and gives Alice in-
formation about it over time. At first, she uses information from MyGenome to explore
parts of her family tree and contribute her genomic data, along with some facts about
herself, to support medical research on diseases of her choosing. Many years after
MyGenome performed the initial sequencing, Alice began experiencing health prob-
lems for which she visited a doctor who used her genomic data to help diagnose a likely
cause and customize a treatment based on variation in her genome sequence. Alice
was impressed by this experience and wondered what other conditions might be in
4Available at https://sites.google.com/site/genoterms.
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her future. After some exploration, she discovered that evidence (based on published
research papers) suggested a high risk of dementia for people with her genomic pro-
file. She worried that various parties, including MyGenome, the genealogy service, and
research studies with whom she shared her data, might share this and other informa-
tion in ways that she did not expect or intend and whether this might have undesired
consequences for her.
Alice’s story highlights several of the special features of genomic data. We depict six
of them in Figure 1, which we review for orientation of the reader.
How does the result of a DNA-based lab test differ from that of other tests? One no-
table feature is how it is static and of long-lived value. Most tests, especially ones Alice
could do for herself, like taking her temperature and blood pressure, are of relatively
short-term value, whereas genomic data changes little over a lifetime and may have
value that lasts for decades. Of course, there are some exceptions to this longevity.
For instance, sequencing techniques improve in accuracy over time, thus tests may be
repeated to improve reliability. Additionally, there are some modifications in DNA that
accumulate over time (e.g., shortening of the ends of DNA strands due to aging [Harley
et al. 1990]). Most particularly, somatic mutations occur, resulting in some degree of
mosaicism in every individual: the most striking examples are the deleterious modifi-
cations of the DNA observed in cancer cells in comparison to DNA derived from normal
cells. However, this long-lasting value means that holding and using genomic data over
extended periods of time, as Alice did, is likely.
Alice’s first use of her genomic data is expected to be a key driver for application
development in the future. While DNA has been used for some time in parentage tests,
it can be generalized from such studies to enable broader inference of kinship relations.
Services such as Ancestry.com and 23andme.com already offer kinship services based
on DNA testing. While a substantial portion of Alice’s DNA is in common with that
of her relatives, it is also unique to her (unless she has an identical twin). This has
another set of implications about potential use of genomic data, such as its ability to
link to her personally, a property that makes DNA testing useful in criminal forensics.
Another special feature of DNA relates to its ability to diagnose problems in health
and behavior. Tests are able to demonstrate increased likelihood for conditions such
as macular degeneration in old age and Alzheimer’s (the most common form of de-
mentia) [Goldman et al. 2011]. Although these are often probabilities, they can have
diagnostic value as well as privacy ramifications [Seddon et al. 2011]. For instance, if
Alice’s relatives learned about her increased risk of dementia, might they (consciously
or unconsciously) trust her judgment a little less? Or might they instead help her to get
timely treatment? This power for good and bad has led genomic data to have a certain
“mystique,” which has been promoted by scientists and the media [Tambor et al. 2002].
The “mystique” surrounding the genomic data is evident from movies and books on the
topic. Examples include the movie Gattaca and the book The DNA Mystique [Nelkin
and Lindee 1995].
Although there are many other types of tests (e.g., protein sequence tests) that carry
key common information with DNA tests, there is a special status that DNA data has
come to occupy, a status that some have phrased as “exceptional” [Bains 2010]. These
special fears about the sharing of genomic data, whether founded or not, cannot be
ignored when considering privacy implications. Hence, while DNA data may or may
not be exceptional [Evans et al. 2010; Gostin and Hodge Jr 1999], it is special in many
ways, thus warrants particular care.
3. USES OF GENOMIC DATA
An individual’s genomic sequence contains over 3 billion base pairs, which are dis-
tributed across 23 chromosomes. Despite its size, it is estimated that the DNA of two
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individuals differ by no more than 0.5% [Venter et al. 2001]; but it is these differ-
ences that influence an individual’s health status and other aspects (as discussed in
Section 2). To provide further context for the importance of genomic data, this section
reviews several of the major applications in practice and under development.
3.1. Health Care
First, it has been recognized that mutation in an individual’s genomic sequence can
influence one’s well-being. In some cases, changes in a particular gene will have an
adverse effect on a person’s health immediately or at some point in the future [Botstein
and Risch 2003]. As of 2014, there were over 1,600 of these traits reported on in the
literature5, ranging from metabolic disorders (e.g., phenylketonuria, which is caused
by a mutation in the PKU gene) to neurodegenerative diseases (e.g., Huntington’s
disease, which is caused by a mutation in the HD gene [MacDonald et al. 1993]) to
blood disorders (e.g., sickle cell anemia, caused by a mutation in the HBB gene [Saiki
et al. 1985]). While some of these diseases are manageable through changes in diet or
pharmacological treatments, others are not and have no known intervention to assist
in the improvement of an individual’s health status. Nonetheless, some individuals
choose to learn their genetic status so that they may plan their future accordingly and
contribute to medical research [Mastromauro et al. 1987] (as elaborated upon later).
Moreover, genetic tests can be applied in a prenatal setting to detect a variety of factors
that can influence health outcomes (e.g., if a fetus is liable to have a congenital defect
that could limit its lifespan, such as Tay-Sach’s disease) [Lippman 1991].
Yet, the majority of variations in an individual’s genome do not follow the monogenic
model. Rather, it has been shown that variation is associated with change in the sus-
ceptibility of an individual to a certain disease or behavior [Botstein and Risch 2003].
Cancer-predisposing variants in genes such as BRCA1 and BRCA2 or the Lynch syn-
drome are well-known examples. Such variationmay also modify an individual’s ability
to respond to a pharmaceutical agent. For instance, individuals can be slow or fast me-
tabolizers, such that they may require a different amount of a drug than is standard
practice, or may gain the greatest benefit from a different drug entirely. This variation
has been leveraged to provide dosing for several medications in practice, including
blood thinners after heart surgery (to prevent clotting) and hypertension management
(to lessen the severity of heart disease) [Pulley et al. 2012]. Additionally, changes in an
individual’s genome detected in a tumor cell can inform which medications are most
appropriate to treat cancer [Feero et al. 2011].
3.2. Research
While the genome has been linked with a significant number of disorders and vari-
able responses to treatments, new associations are being discovered on a weekly basis.
Technology for performing such basic research continues to undergo rapid advances
[Brunham and Hayden 2012]. The dramatic decrease in the cost of genome sequenc-
ing has made it increasingly possible to collect, store, and computationally analyze
sequenced genomic data on a fine-grained level, as well as over populations on the
order of millions of people (e.g., China’s Kadoorie biobank [Chen et al. 2011] and the
UK Biobank [Allen et al. 2014] will each contain genomic data on 500,000 individuals
by the end of 2014, while the U.S. National Cancer Institute is at the beginning of its
Million Cancer Genome Project [Haussler et al. 2012]). Yet, it should be recognized that
computational analysis is separate from, and more costly than, sequencing technology
itself (e.g., the $1K analysis of a genome is far from being developed).
5http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Omim/mimstats.html.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 48, No. 1, Article 6, Publication date: August 2015.
Privacy in the Genomic Era 6:7
Moreover, technological advances in genome sequencing are coalescing with a big
data revolution in the health care domain. Large quantities of data derived from elec-
tronic health records (EHRs), for instance, are beingmade available to support research
on clinical phenotypes that, until several years ago, were deemed to be too noisy and
complex to model [Gottesman et al. 2013a]. As a consequence, genome sequences have
become critical components of the biomedical research process [Kohane 2011].
3.3. Direct-to-Consumer Services
Historically, genome sequencing was a complex and expensive process that was left to
large research laboratories or diagnostic services, but in the past several years, there
has been a rise in DTC genome sequencing from various companies [Prainsack and
Vayena 2013]. These services have made it affordable for individuals to become di-
rectly involved in the collection, processing, and even analysis of their genomic data.
The DTC movement has enabled individuals to learn about their disease susceptibility
risks (as alluded to earlier), and even perform genetic compatibility tests with poten-
tial partners. Moreover, and perhaps more important, DTC has made it possible for
individuals to be provided with digital representations of their genome sequences, such
that they can control how such information is disclosed, to whom, and when.
Of course, not all consumer products are oriented toward health applications. For
example, genomic data is increasingly applied to determine and/or track kinship. This
information has been applied, for instance, to track an individual’s ancestral heritage
and determine the extent to which individuals with the same surname are related with
respect to their genomic variance [Jobling 2001].
3.4. Legal and Forensic
Given the static nature of genomic sequences, this information has often been used
for investigative purposes. For instance, this information may be applied in contested
parentage suits [Anderlik 2003]. Moreover, DNA found at a crime scene (or on a victim)
may be used as evidence by law enforcement to track down suspected criminals [Kaye
and Smith 2003]. It is not unheard of for residents of a certain geographic region to
be compelled to provide tissue samples to law enforcement to help in such investi-
gations [Greely et al. 2006]. Given the kinship relationships that such information
communicates, DNA from an unknown suspect has been compared to relatives to de-
termine the corresponding individual’s likely identity in order to better facilitate a
manhunt.
One of the concerns of such uses, however, is that it is unclear how law enforcement
may retain and/or use this information in the future. The U.S. Supreme Court recently
ruled that it is permissible for law enforcement to collect and retain DNA on suspects,
even if the suspects are not subsequently prosecuted [Maryland v. King 2013]. Once
DNA is shed by an individual (such as from saliva left on a coffee cup in a restaurant)
it has been held as an “abandoned” resource [Joh 2006], such that the corresponding
individual relinquishes rights of ownership. While the notion of “abandoned DNA”
remains a hotly contested issue, it is currently the case in the United States that DNA
collected from discarded materials can be sequenced and used by anyone without the
consent of the individual from which it was derived.
4. RELEVANCE OF GENOME PRIVACY
As discussed in Section 2, genomic data has numerous distinguishing features and
applications. As a consequence, the leakage of this information may have serious im-
plications if misused, as in genetic discrimination (e.g., for insurance, employment, or
education) or blackmail [Gottlieb 2001]. A true story exemplifying genetic discrimina-
tion was shared by Dr. Noralane Lindor at the Mayo Clinic’s Individualizing Medicine
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Conference (2012) [Lindor 2012]. During her study of a cancer patient, Dr. Lindor also
sequenced the grandchildren of her patient, two of whom turned out to have the muta-
tion for the same type of cancer6. One of these grandchildren applied to the U.S. Army
to become a helicopter pilot. Even though genetic testing is not a required procedure
for military recruitment, as soon as she revealed that she previously went through the
aforementioned genetic test, she was rejected for the position (in this case, legislation
does not apply to military recruitment, as will be discussed later).
Ironically, the familial aspect of genomics complicates the problems revolving around
privacy. A recent example is the debate between the familymembers of Henrietta Lacks
and medical researchers [Skloot 2013]. Ms. Lacks (deceased in 1951) was diagnosed
with cervical cancer and some of her cancer cells were removed for medical research.
These cells later paved the way to important developments in medical treatment.
Recently, researchers sequenced and published Ms. Lacks’s genome without asking for
the consent of her living family members. These relatives learned this information from
the author of the bestselling book The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks [Skloot and
Turpin 2010], and they expressed the concern that the sequence contained information
about her family members. After complaints, the researchers took her genomic data
down from public databases. However, the privacy-sensitive genomic information of
the members of the Lacks family was already compromised because some of the data
had already been downloaded and many investigators had previously published parts
of the cells’ sequence. Although the NIH entered into an agreement with the Lacks
family to give them a voice in the use of these cells [Ritter 2013], there is no consensus
about the scope of control that individuals and their families ought to have over the
downstream of their cells. Thousands of people, including James Watson [Nyholt et al.
2008], have placed their genomic data on the Web without seeking permission of their
relatives.
One of the often voiced concerns regarding genomic data is its potential for discrimi-
nation. While, today, certain genome-disease and genome-trait associations are known,
we do not know what will be inferred from one’s genomic data in the future. In fact, a
grandson of Henrietta Lacks expressed his concern about the public availability of his
grandmother’s genome by saying that “themain issuewas the privacy concern andwhat
information in the future might be revealed.” Therefore, it is likely that the privacy
sensitivity of genomic data, and thus the potential threats, will increase over time.
Threats emerging from genomic data are only possible via the leakage of such data; in
today’s health care system, there are several candidates for the source of this leakage.
Genomic data can be leaked through a reckless clinician, the IT system of a hospital
(e.g., through a breach of the information security), or the sequencing facility. If the
storage of such data is outsourced to a third party, data can also be leaked from such
a database through a hacker’s activity or a disgruntled employee. Similarly, if the
genomic data is stored by the individual (e.g., on a smartphone), it can be leaked due
to malware. Furthermore, surprisingly, sometimes the leakage is performed by the
genome owner. For example, on a genome-sharing website, openSNP7 [Greshake et al.
2014], people upload the variants in their genomes – sometimes with their identifying
material, including their real names.
One way of protecting the privacy of individuals’ genomic data is through the
law or policy. In 2007, the U.S. adopted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act (GINA), which prohibits certain types of discrimination in access to health in-
surance and employment. Similarly, the U.S. presidential report on genome privacy
[Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 2012] discusses policies
6Having a genetic mutation for a cancer only probabilistically increases the predisposition to the cancer.
7Hosted at http://www.openSNP.org.
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and techniques to protect the privacy of genomic data. In 2008, the Council of Eu-
rope adopted the convention concerning genetic testing for health purposes [Council of
Europe 2008]. There are, in fact, hundreds of legal systems in the world, ranging in
scope from federal to state/province and municipality level, each of which can adopt
different definitions, rights, and responsibilities for an individual’s privacy. Yet, while
such legislation may be put into practice, it is challenging to enforce because the uses
of data cannot always be detected. Additionally, legal regimes may be constructed such
that they are subject to interpretation or leave loopholes in place. For example, GINA
does not apply to life insurance or the military [Altman and Klein 2002]. Therefore,
legislation alone, while critical in shaping the norms of society, is insufficient to prevent
privacy violations.
The idea of using technical solutions to guarantee the privacy of such sensitive and
valuable data brings about interesting debates. On one hand, the potential impor-
tance of genomic data for mankind is tremendous. Yet, privacy-enhancing technologies
may be considered an obstacle to achieving these goals. Technological solutions for
genome privacy can be achieved by various techniques, such as cryptography or ob-
fuscation (proposed solutions are discussed in detail in Section 7). Yet, cryptographic
techniques typically reduce the efficiency of the algorithms, introducing more com-
putational overload, while preventing the users of such data from “viewing” the data.
Obfuscation-basedmethods also reduce the accuracy (or utility) of genomic data. There-
fore, especially when human life is at stake, the applicability of such privacy-enhancing
techniques for genomic data is questionable.
On the other hand, to expedite advances in personalized medicine, genome–phenome
association studies often require the participation of a large number of research partici-
pants. To encourage individuals to enroll in such studies, it is crucial to adhere to ethical
principles, such as autonomy, reciprocity, and trust more generally (e.g., guarantee that
genomic data will not be misused). Considering today’s legal systems, the most reliable
way to provide such trust pledges may be to use privacy-enhancing technologies for
the management of genomic data. It would severely discredit a medical institution’s
reputation if it failed to fulfill the trust requirements for the participants of a medical
study. More important, a violation of trust could slow down genomic research (e.g., by
causing individuals to think twice before they participate in a medical study) possibly
more than the overload introduced due to privacy-enhancing technologies. Similarly,
in law enforcement, genomic data now being used in the U.S. Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation’s (FBI’s) Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) should be managed in a
privacy-preserving way to avoid potential future problems (e.g., mistrials, law suits).
In short, we need techniques that will guarantee the security and privacy of genomic
data, without significantly degrading the efficiency of the use of genomic data in re-
search and health care. Obviously, achieving all of these properties would require some
compromise. Our preliminary assessment of expert opinion (discussed in Section 5)
begins to investigate what tradeoffs users of such data would consider appropriate.
5. GENOMICS/GENETICS EXPERT OPINION
5.1. Objective
We explored the views of an opportunistically ascertained group of biomedical re-
searchers in order to probe levels of concern about privacy and security to be addressed
in formulating guidelines and in future research.
5.2. Survey Design
The field of genomics is relatively young, and its privacy implications are still be-
ing refined. Based on informal discussions (primarily with computer scientists) and
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Fig. 2. Probes of attitudes regarding the use of genomic data.
our review of the literature, we designed a survey to learn more about biomedical
researchers’ level of concern about genomics and privacy. Specifically, the survey in-
quired about (i) widely held assertions about genome privacy, (ii) ongoing and ex-
isting research directions on genome privacy, and (iii) sharing of an individual’s ge-
nomic data, using the probes in Figure 2. The full survey instrument is available at
http://goo.gl/forms/jwiyx2hqol. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign granted an exemption for the survey. Several
prior surveys focused on genome privacy have been conducted and have focused on the
perspectives of the general public [Kaufman et al. 2009, 2012; Platt et al. 2013; De
Cristofaro 2014b] and geneticists [Pulley et al. 2008]. Our survey is different because
it investigates the opinion of biomedical researchers with respect to the intention of
data protection by technical means.
5.3. Data Collection Methodology
We conducted our survey both online and by paper. Snowball sampling [Goodman 1961]
was used to recruit subjects for the online survey. This approach enables us to get more
responses, but the frame is unknown and thus response rate cannot be reported. A
URL for the online survey was sent to the people working in genomics/genetics areas
(i.e., molecular biology professors, bioinformaticians, physicians, genomics/genetics re-
searchers) known to the authors of this article. Recipients were asked to forward it to
other biomedical experts they know. E-mail and Facebook private messages (as an easy
alternative for e-mail) were used to conduct the survey. Eight surveys were collected
by handing out paper copies to participants of a genomics medicine conference. The
survey was administered to 61 individuals.
5.4. Potential Biases
We designed the survey to begin to explore the extent to which biomedical researchers
share concerns expressed by some computer scientists. While not generalizable to
all biomedical experts due to the method of recruiting participants, their responses do
provide preliminary insights into areas of concern about privacy and security expressed
by biomedical experts.More research is needed to assess the representativeness of these
views.
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Fig. 3. Self-identified expertise of the survey respondents.
Fig. 4. Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes are
described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means that the respondent does not agree with any of the probes.
Fig. 5. Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web?
5.5. Findings
Approximately half of the participants were from the United States and slightly less
than half from Europe (the rest selected “other”). The participants were also asked to
report their expertise in genomics/genetics and security/privacy. We show these results
in Figure 3.
We asked whether the subjects agree with the statements listed in Figure 2.
Figure 4 shows the results: 20% of the respondents believe that protecting genome
privacy is impossible as individuals’ genomic data can be obtained from their leftover
cells (Probe 1). Almost half of the respondents consider genomic data to be no differ-
ent than other health data (Probe 2). Even though genomic information is, in most
instances, nondeterministic, all respondents believe that this fact does not reduce the
importance of genome privacy (Probe 3). Only 7% of our respondents think that pro-
tecting genome privacy should be left to bioinformaticians (Probe 4). Furthermore, 20%
of the respondents believe that genome privacy can be fully guaranteed by legislation
(Probe 5). Notably, only 7% of the respondents think that privacy enhancing technolo-
gies are a nuisance in the case of genetics (Probe 6). According to only about 10% of
the respondents, the confidentiality of genomic data is superfluous because it is hard
to identify a person from that person’s variants (Probe 7). Finally, about 30% of the
respondents think that advantages that will be brought by genomics in health care will
justify the harm that might be caused by privacy issues (Probe 8).
We asked participants whether they would share their genomes on the Web
(Figure 5). A total of 48% of the respondents are not in favor of doing so, while 30%
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Fig. 6. Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information about
his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data?
Fig. 7. Response to the question: What can we compromise to improve privacy of genomic data? (Multiple
options can be checked.)
Fig. 8. Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community.
would reveal their genome anonymously, and 8% would reveal their identities along-
side their genome. We also asked respondents how they think about the scope of the
individual’s right to share one’s genomic data given that the data contain information
about the individual’s blood relatives. Figure 6 shows that only 18% of the respondents
think that one should not be allowed to share, 43% of the respondents think that one
should be allowed to share only for medical purposes, and 39% of the respondents think
that one should have the right to share one’s genomic data publicly.
As discussed in Section 4, there is a tension between the desire for genome privacy
and biomedical research. Thus, we asked the survey participants what they would
trade for privacy. The results (shown in Figure 7) indicate that the respondents are
willing to trade money and test time (duration) to protect privacy, but they usually do
not accept trading accuracy or utility.
We also asked the respondents to evaluate the importance of existing and ongoing
research directions on genome privacy (as discussed in detail in Section 7), considering
the types of problems they are trying to solve (Figure 8). The majority of respondents
think that genomics privacy is important.
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5.6. Discussion
Our results show that these biomedical researchers believe that genomic privacy is
important and needs special attention. Figure 4 shows that, except for Probes 2 and
8, 80% of the biomedical experts do not endorse the statements listed in Figure 2.
Approximately three-quarters of the biomedical experts believe that advantages of
genome-based health care do not justify the harm that can be caused by the genome
privacy breach. Probe 2 is an interesting result in that about half of the biomedical
experts believe that genomic data should be treated as any other sensitive health
data. This seems reasonable because, at the moment, health data canbe more sensitive
than genomic data in many instances. The biomedical community also agrees on the
importance of current genome privacy research. Figure 8 shows that these biomedical
researchers rank the placement of genomic data to the cloud as their prime concern.
Moreover, they agree with the importance of other genome privacy research topics
shown in Figure 8.
We provide additional results in the Appendix stratified according to the expertise
of the participants.
6. KNOWN PRIVACY RISKS
In this section, we survey a wide spectrum of privacy threats to human genomic data,
as reported by prior research.
6.1. Re-identification Threats
Re-identification is probably the most extensively studied privacy risk in dissemination
and analysis of human genomic data. In such an attack, an unauthorized party looks
at the published human genomes that are already under certain protection to hide the
identity information of their donors (e.g., patients), and tries to recover the identities of
the individuals involved. Such an attack, once it succeeds, can cause serious damage to
those donors, for example, discrimination and financial loss. In this section, we review
the weaknesses within existing privacy protection techniques that make this type of
attack possible.
Pseudo-anonymized Data. A widely used method for protecting health information is
the removal of explicit and quasi-identifying attributes (e.g., name and date of birth).
Such redaction meets legal requirements to protect privacy (e.g., de-identification un-
der the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) for traditional health
records. However, genomic data cannot be anonymized by just removing the identify-
ing information. There is always a risk for the adversary to infer the phenotype of a
DNA-material donor (i.e., the person’s observable characteristics such as eye/hair/skin
colors), which will lead to the donor’s identification from genotypes (genetic makeup).
Even though the techniques for this purpose are still rudimentary, the rapid progress
in genomic research and technologies is quickly moving us toward that end. Moreover,
re-identification can be achieved through inspecting the background information that
comes with publicized DNA sequences [Gitschier 2009; Gymrek et al. 2013; Hayden
2013]. As an example, genomic variants on the Y chromosome have been correlatedwith
surnames (for males), which can be found using public geneology databases. Other in-
stances include identifying Personal Genome Project (PGP) participants through public
demographic data [Sweeney et al. 2013], recovering the identities of family members
from the data released by the 1000Genome Project using public information (e.g., death
notices) [Malin 2006], and other correlation attacks [Malin and Sweeney 2004]. It has
been shown that even cryptographically secure protocols leak a lot of information when
used for genomic data [Goodrich 2009].
Attacks on Machine-Learning Models. Most attacks on genomic data use the en-
tire dataset for the attack. Recently, Fredrikson et al. [2014] showed that even the
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machine-learning models trained on the genomic data can reveal information about
the people whose data was used for training the model as well as any arbitrary person
given some background information.
6.2. Phenotype Inference
Another critical privacy threat to human genome data is inference of sensitive pheno-
type information from the DNA sequence. Here, we summarize related prior studies.
Aggregate Genomic Data. In addition to the re-identification threats discussed in
Section 6.1, which come from the possible correlation between an individual’s genomic
data and other public information, the identity of a participant of a genomic study
can also be revealed by a “second sample,” that is, part of the DNA information from
the individual. This happens, for example, when one obtains a small amount of ge-
nomic data from another individual, such as a small set of that person’s SNPs, and
attempts to determine the individual’s presence in a clinical study on HIV (a pheno-
type), based on anonymized patient DNA data published online. This turns out to be
rather straightforward, given the uniqueness of an individual’s genome. Particularly,
in 2004, research shows that as few as 75 independent SNPs are enough to uniquely
distinguish one individual from others [Lin et al. 2004]. Based on this observation, the
genomic researchers generally agree that such DNA raw data are too sensitive to re-
lease through online repositories (such as the NIH’s PopSet resources), without proper
agreements in place. An alternative is to publish “pooled” data, in which summary
statistics are disclosed for the case and control groups of individuals in a study.
Yet, Homer et al. [2008] showed that when adversaries had access to a known par-
ticipant’s genome sequence, they could determine if the participant was in a certain
group. Specifically, the researchers compared one individual’s DNA sample to the rates
at which the person’s variants show up in various study populations (and a reference
population that does not include the individual) and applied a statistical hypothesis test
to determine the likelihood of which group the person is in (i.e., case or reference). The
findings of the work led the NIH, as well as the Wellcome Trust in the United Kingdom,
to remove all publicly available aggregate genomic data from their Web sites. Ever since,
researchers are required to sign a data use agreement (prohibiting re-identification) to
access such data [Zerhouni and Nabel 2008], the process of which could take several
months. At the same time, such attacks were enhanced. First, Homer’s test statistic
was improved through exploitation of genotype frequencies [Jacobs et al. 2009], while
an alternative, based on linear regression, was developed to facilitate more robust in-
ference attacks [Masca et al. 2011]. Wang et al. [2009a] demonstrated, perhaps, an
even more powerful attack by showing that an individual can be identified even from
the aggregate statistical data (linkage disequilibrium measures) published in research
papers. While the methodology introduced in Homer et al. [2008] requires on the order
of 10,000 genetic variations (of the target individual), this new attack requires only
on the order of 200. Their approach even shows the possibility of recovering part of
the DNA raw sequences for the participants of biomedical studies, using the statistics
including p-values and coefficient of determination (r2) values.
Quantification of information content in aggregate statistics obtained as an output
of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) shows that an individual’s participation
in the study and that person’s phenotype can be inferred with high accuracy [Im et al.
2012; Craig et al. 2011]. Beyond theseworks, it has been shown that aBayesian network
could be leveraged to incorporate additional background information, and thus improve
predictive power [Clayton 2010]. It was recently shown that RNA expression data can
be linked to the identity of an individual through the inference of SNPs [Schadt et al.
2012].
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Yet, there is debate over the practicality of such attacks. Some researchers believe
that individual identification from pooled data is hard in practice [Braun et al. 2009;
Sankararaman et al. 2009; Visscher and Hill 2009; Gilbert 2008]. In particular, it has
been shown that the assumptions required to accurately identify individuals from ag-
gregate genomic data rarely hold in practice [Braun et al. 2009]. Such inference attacks
depend on the ancestry of the participants, the absolute and relative number of people
in case and control groups, and the number of SNPs [Masca et al. 2011] and the avail-
ability of the second sample. Thus, the false-positive rates are much higher in practice.
Still, others believe that publication of complete genome-wide aggregate results are
dangerous for privacy of the participants [Lumley and Rice 2010; Church et al. 2009].
Furthermore, the NIH continues to adhere to its policy of data use agreements.
Beyond the sharing of aggregate data, it should be recognized that millions of people
are sequenced or genotyped for the state-of-the-art GWAS studies. This sequenced
data is shared among different institutions with inconsistent security and privacy
procedures [Brenner 2013]. On the one hand, this could lead to serious backlash and
fear of participating in such studies. On the other hand, not sharing this data could
severely impede biomedical research. Thus, measures should be taken to mitigate the
negative outcomes of genomic data sharing [Brenner 2013].
Correlation of Genomic Data. Partially available genomic data can be used to infer the
unpublished genomic data due to linkage disequilibrium (LD), a correlation between
regions of the genome [Halperin and Stephan 2009; Marchini and Howie 2010]. For
example, Jim Watson (the discoverer of DNA) donated his genome for research but
concealed his ApoE gene, because it reveals susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease. Yet,
it was shown that the ApoE gene variant can be inferred from the published genome
[Nyholt et al. 2008]. Such completion attacks are quite relevant in DTC environments,
where customers have the option to hide some of the variants related to a particular
disease.
While all the prior genomic privacy attacks exploit low-order SNP correlations,
Samani et al. [2015] show that high-order SNP correlations result in far more powerful
attacks.
Wagner [2015] investigates 22 different privacy metrics to study which metrics are
more meaningful to quantify the loss of genomic privacy due to correlation of genomic
data.
Kin Privacy Breach. A significant part of the population does not want to publicly
release their genomic data [McGuire et al. 2011]. Disclosures of their relatives can thus
threaten the privacy of such people, who never release their genomic data. The haplo-
types of the individuals not sequenced or genotyped can be obtained using LD-based
completion attacks [Kong et al. 2008]. For instance, if both parents are genotyped,
then most of the variants for their offspring can be inferred. The genomic data of fam-
ily members can also be inferred using data that has been publicly shared by blood
relatives and domain-specific knowledge about genomics [Humbert et al. 2013]. Such
reconstruction attacks can be carried out using (i) (partial) genomic data of a subset of
family members, and (ii) publicly known genomic background information (linkage dis-
equilibrium andminor allele frequencies (MAFs). This attack affects individuals whose
relatives publicly share genomic data (obtained using DTC services) on the Internet
(e.g., on openSNP [Greshake et al. 2014]). The family members of the individuals who
publish their genomic data on openSNP can be found on social media sites, such as
Facebook [Humbert et al. 2013].
Note that “correlation of genomic data” and “kin privacy breach” attacks are based on
different structural aspects of genomic data, while correlation attacks are based on the
LD, which is a genetic variation within an individual’s genome. A kin privacy breach
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is caused by genomic correlations among individuals. Moreover, a kin privacy breach
can also be realized through phenotype information alone. For instance, a parent’s skin
color or height can be used to predict the child’s skin color or height.
6.3. Other Threats
In addition to these threats, there are a few other genome-related privacy issues.
Anonymous Paternity Breach. As mentioned previously, the Y chromosome is inher-
ited from father to son virtually intact and genealogy databases link this chromosome
to the surname to model ancestry. Beyond the case discussed earlier, this information
has been used to identify sperm donors in several cases. For example, a 15-year-old
boy who was conceived using donor sperm successfully found his biological father by
sending his cheek swab to a genealogy service and doing Internet search [Motluk 2005;
Stein 2005]. Similarly, an adopted child was able to find his real father with the help
of a genealogy database (and substantial manual effort) [Naik 2009]. In short, DNA
testing has made tracing anonymous sperm donors easy; thus, theoretically, sperm
donors can no longer be anonymous [Lehmann-Haupt 2010].
Legal and Forensic. DNA is collected for legal and forensic purposes from criminals8
and victims9. On the one hand, forensic techniques are becoming more promising with
the evolving technology [Kayser and de Knijff 2011; Pakstis et al. 2010]. On the other
hand, abuse of DNA (e.g., to stage crime scenes) have already baffled people and law
enforcement agencies [Bobellan 2010]. Some people, such as the singer Madonna, are
paranoid enough about the misuse of their DNA that they hire DNA sterilization teams
to clean up their leftover DNA (e.g., stray hairs or saliva) [Villalva 2012]. We are not
aware of any privacy risk assessment studies done primarily in legal and forensic
context, in part because law enforcement agencies store a very limited amount of
genetic markers. Yet, in the future, it could well happen that law enforcement agencies
will have access to the database of whole genome sequences. We discussed sperm donor
paternity breach earlier, which is also relevant in a legal context.
7. STATE-OF-THE-ART SOLUTIONS
In this section, we provide an overview of technical approaches to address various
privacy and security issues related to genomic data. Despite the risks associated with
genomic data, we can find ways to mitigate them to move forward [Altman et al. 2013].
Some solutions are efficient enough for practical use, while others need further improve-
ment to become practical. In particular, practical solutions often exploit the special na-
ture of the genomic data to findways to be efficient under relevant domain assumptions.
7.1. Health Care
Personalized medicine. Personalized medicine promises to revolutionize health care
through treatments tailored to an individual’s genomic makeup and genome-based
disease risk tests that can enable early diagnosis of serious diseases. Various players
have different concerns here. Patients, for instance, are concerned about the privacy
of their genomes. Health care organizations are concerned about their reputation and
the trust of their clients. For-profit companies, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers,
are concerned about the secrecy of their disease markers (proprietary information of
business importance).
A disease risk test can be expressed as a regular expression query taking into account
sequencing errors and other properties of sequenced genomic data. Oblivious automata
8http://www.justice.gov/ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes.
9http://www.rainn.org/get-information/sexual-assault-recovery/rape-kit.
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enable regular expression queries to be computed over genome sequence data while
preserving the privacy of both the queries and the genomic data [Troncoso-Pastoriza
et al. 2007; Frikken 2009]. Cryptographic schemes have been developed to delegate
the intensive computation in such a scheme to a public cloud in a privacy-preserving
fashion [Blanton et al. 2012].
Alternatively, it has been shown that a cryptographic primitive called Authorized
Private Set Intersection (A-PSI) can be used in this setting [Baldi et al. 2011; De
Cristofaro et al. 2012]. In personalized medicine protocols based on A-PSI, the health
care organization provides cryptographically authorized disease markers, while the
patient supplies one’s genome. In this setting, a regulatory authority, such as the FDA,
can also certify the diseasemarkers before they can be used in a clinical setting. Despite
its potential, this protocol has certain limitations. First, it is not very efficient in terms
of its communication and computation costs. Second, the model assumes that patients
store their own genomes, which is not necessarily the case in practice.
To address the latter issue, it has been suggested that the storage of the homo-
morphically encrypted variants (e.g., SNPs) can be delegated to a semi-honest third
party [Ayday et al. 2013c]. A health care organization can then request the third party
to compute a disease susceptibility test (weighted average of the risk associated with
each variant) on the encrypted variants using an interactive protocol involving (i) the
patient, (ii) the health care organization, and (iii) the third party. Additive homomor-
phic encryption enables a party with the public key to add ciphertexts or multiply a
plaintext constant to a ciphertext. Additive homomorphic encryption-based methods
can also be used to conduct privacy-preserving computation of disease risk based on
both genomic and nongenomic data (e.g., environmental and/or clinical data) [Ayday
et al. 2013e]. One of the problems with such protocols, however, is that storage of
homomorphically encrypted variants require orders of magnitude more memory than
plaintext variants. However, a trade-off between the storage cost and level of privacy
can be composed [Ayday et al. 2013b]. A second problem is that when an adversary has
knowledge of the LD between the genome regions and the nature of the test, the pri-
vacy of the patients will decrease when tests are conducted on their homomorphically
encrypted variants. This loss of privacy can be quantified using an entropy-based met-
ric [Ayday et al. 2013d]. Danezis and De Cristofaro [2014] propose two cryptographic
protocols using framework proposed by Ayday et al. [2013d]. The first protocol involves
a patient and a medical center (MC). MC encrypts the (secret) weights, sends them to
the patient’s smartcard, and operations are done inside the smartcard. This protocol
also hides which and howmany SNPs are tested. The second protocol is based on secret
sharing in which the (secret) weights of a test are shared between the SPU and theMC.
This protocol still relies on a smartcard (held by the patient) to finalize the computa-
tion. Djatmiko et al. [2014] propose a secure evaluation algorithm to compute genomic
tests that are based on a linear combination of genome data values. In their setting,
a medical center prescribes a test and the client (patient) accesses a server via mobile
device to perform the test. The main goals are to (i) keep the coefficients of the test
(secret weights) secret from the client, (ii) keep selection of the SNPs confidential from
the client, and (iii) keep SNPs of the client confidential from the server (the server se-
curely selects data from the client). They achieve these goals by using a combination of
additive homomorphic encryption (Paillier’s scheme) and private information retrieval.
Test calculations are performed on the client’s mobile device and the medical server
can also perform some related computations. Eventually, the client gets the result
and shows it to the physician. As a case study, the authors implemented the warfarin
dosing algorithm as a representative example. They also implemented a prototype sys-
tem in an Android app. Karvelas et al. [2014] propose a technique to store genomic data
in encrypted form, use an Oblivious RAM to access the desired data without leaking
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the access pattern, and finally run secure two-party computation protocol to privately
compute the required function on the retrieved encrypted genomic data. The proposed
construction includes two separate servers: cloud and proxy.
Functional encryption allows a user to compute on encrypted data and learn the re-
sult in plaintext in a noninteractive fashion. However, currently functional encryption
is very inefficient. Naveed et al. [2014] propose a new cryptographic model called Con-
trolled Functional Encryption (C-FE) that allows construction of realistic and efficient
schemes. The authors propose two C-FE constructions: one for inner-product function-
ality and other for any polynomial-time computable functionality. The former is based
on a careful combination of CCA2 secure public-key encryption with secret sharing,
while the latter is based on a careful combination of CCA2 secure public-key encryp-
tion with Yao’s garbled circuit. C-FE constructions are based on efficient cryptographic
primitives and perform very well in practical applications. The authors evaluated C-FE
constructions on personalized medicine, genomic patient similarity, and paternity test
applications and showed that C-FE provides much better security and efficiency than
prior work.
Raw aligned genomic data. Raw aligned genomic data, that is, the aligned outputs
of a DNA sequencer, are often used by geneticists in the research process. Due to the
limitations of current sequencing technology, it is often the case that only a small
number of nucleotides are read (from the sequencer) at a time. A very large number
of these short reads10 covering the entire genome are obtained, and are subsequently
aligned, using a reference genome. The position of the read relative to the reference
genome is determined by finding the approximatematch on the reference genome.With
today’s sequencing techniques, the size of such data can be up to 300GB per individual
(in the clear), which makes public key cryptography impractical for the management
of such data. Symmetric stream cipher and order-preserving encryption [Agrawal et al.
2004] provide more efficient solutions for storing, retrieving, and processing this large
amount of data in a privacy-preserving way [Ayday et al. 2014]. Order-preserving
encryption keeps the ordering information in the ciphertexts to enable range queries
on the encrypted data. We emphasize that order-preserving encryption may not be
secure for most practical applications.
Genetic compatibility testing. Genetic compatibility testing is of interest in both
health care and DTC settings. It enables a pair of individuals to evaluate the risk of
conceiving an unhealthy baby. In this setting, PSI can be used to compute genetic com-
patibility, in which one party submits the fingerprint for one’s genome-based diseases,
while the other party submits one’s entire genome. In doing so, the couple learns their
genetic compatibility without revealing their entire genomes [Baldi et al. 2011]. This
protocol leaks information about an individual’s disease risk status to the other party,
and its requirements for computation and communication may make it impractical.
Pseudo-anonymization. Pseudo-anonymization is often performed by the health care
organization that collects the specimen (possibly by pathologists) to remove patient
identifiers before sending the specimen to a sequencing laboratory. In lieu of such in-
formation, a pseudonym can be derived from the genome itself and public randomness,
independently at the health care organization and sequence laboratory for symmetric
encryption [Cassa et al. 2013]. This process can mitigate sample mismatch at the se-
quencing lab. However, since the key is derived from the data that is encrypted using
the same key, symmetric encryption should guarantee circular security (security notion
10A short read corresponds to a sequence of nucleotides within a DNA molecule. The raw genomic data of an
individual consists of hundreds of millions of short reads. Each read typically consists of 100 nucleotides.
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required when a cipher is used to encrypt its own key), an issue which is not addressed
in the published protocol.
Confidentiality against Brute-force Attacks. History has shown that encryption
schemes have a limited lifetime before they are broken. Genomic data, however, has
a lifetime much longer than that of state-of-the-art encryption schemes. A brute-force
attack works by decrypting the ciphertext with all possible keys. Honey encryption
(HE) [Juels and Ristenpart 2014] guarantees that a ciphertext decrypted with an in-
correct key (as guessed by an adversary) results in a plausible-looking yet incorrect
plaintext. Therefore, HE gives encrypted data an additional layer of protection by serv-
ing up fake data in response to every incorrect guess of a cryptographic key or password.
However, HE relies on a highly accurate distribution-transforming encoder (DTE) over
the message space. Unfortunately, this requirement jeopardizes the practicality of HE.
To use HE, themessage space needs to be understood quantitatively, that is, the precise
probability of every possible message needs to be understood. When messages are not
uniformly distributed, characterizing and quantifying the distribution is nontrivial.
Building an efficient and precise DTE is the main challenge when extending HE to a
real-use case; Huang et al. [2015] have designed such a DTE for genomic data. We note
that HE scheme for genomic data is not specific to health care and is relevant for any
use of genomic data.
7.2. Research
Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS). Genome-Wide Association Studies
(GWAS),11 are conducted by analyzing the statistical correlation between the variants
of a case group (i.e., phenotype positive) and a control group (i.e., phenotype negative).
GWAS is one of the most common types of studies performed to learn genome–phenome
associations. In GWAS, the aggregate statistics (e.g., p-values) are published in scien-
tific articles and are made available to other researchers. As mentioned earlier, such
statistics can pose privacy threats, as explained in Section 6.
Recently, it has been suggested that such information can be protected through the
application of noise to the data. In particular, differential privacy, a well-known tech-
nique for answering statistical queries in a privacy-preserving manner [Dwork 2006],
was recently adapted to compose privacy-preserving query mechanisms for GWAS
settings [Fienberg et al. 2011; Johnson and Shmatikov 2013]. A mechanism K gives
-differential privacy if for all databases D and D′ differing on at most one record, the
probability of K(D) is less than or equal to the probability of exp() × K(D′). In simple
words, if we compute a function on a database with and without a single individual and
the answer in both cases is approximately the same, then we say that the function is
differentially private. Essentially, if the answer does not change when an individual is
or is not in the database, the answer does not compromise the privacy of that individ-
ual. Fienberg et al. [2011] propose methods for releasing differentially private MAFs,
chi-square statistics, p-values, the top-k most relevant SNPs to a specific phenotype,
and specific correlations between particular pairs of SNPs. These methods are notable
because traditional differential privacy techniques are unsuitable for GWAS due to the
fact that the number of correlations studied inGWAS ismuch larger than the number of
people in the study.However, differential privacy is typically based on amechanism that
adds noise (e.g., by using Laplacian noise, geometric noise, or exponential mechanism),
thus requires a very large number of research participants to guarantee acceptable
levels of privacy and utility. Yu et al. [2014] have extended the work of Fienberg et al.
[2011] to compute differentially private chi-square statistics for an arbitrary number of
11http://www.genome.gov/20019523.
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cases and controls. Johnson and Shmatikov [2013] explain that computing the number
of relevant SNPs and the pairs of correlated SNPs are the goals of a typical GWAS
and are not known in advance. They provide a new exponential mechanism – called a
distance-score mechanism – to add noise to the output. All relevant queries required by
a typical GWAS are supported, including the number of SNPs associated with a disease
and the locations of the most significant SNPs. Their empirical analysis suggests that
the new approach produces acceptable privacy and utility for a typical GWAS.
Ameta-analysis of summary statistics frommultiple independent cohorts is required
to find associations in a GWAS. Different teams of researchers often conduct studies
on different cohorts, but are limited in their ability to share individual-level data
due to institutional review board (IRB) restrictions. However, it is possible for the
same participant to be in multiple studies, which can affect the results of a meta-
analysis. It has been suggested that one-way cryptographic hashing can be used to
identify overlapping participants without sharing individual-level data [Turchin and
Hirschhorn 2012].
Xie et al. [2014] proposed a cryptographic approach for privacy-preserving genome–
phenome studies. This approach enables privacy-preserving computation of genome–
phenome associations when the data are distributed among multiple sites.
Sequence comparison. Sequence comparison is widely used in bioinformatics (e.g.,
in gene finding, motif finding, and sequence alignment). Such comparison is compu-
tationally complex. Cryptographic tools such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
and secure multiparty computation (SMC) can be used for privacy-preserving sequence
comparison. Fully homomorphic encryption enables any party with the public key to
compute any arbitrary function on the ciphertext without ever decrypting it. Multi-
party computation enables a group of parties to compute a function of their inputs
without revealing anything other than the output of the function to each other. It has
been shown that fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), secure multiparty computation
(SMC), and other traditional cryptographic tools [Atallah et al. 2003; Jha et al. 2008]
can be applied for comparison purposes, but they do not scale to a full human genome.
Alternatively, more scalable, provably secure protocols exploiting public clouds have
been proposed [Blanton et al. 2012; Atallah and Li 2005]. Computation on the public
data can be outsourced to a third-party environment (e.g., cloud provider) while com-
putation on sensitive private sections can be performed locally; thus, outsourcing most
of the computationally intensive work to the third party. This computation partition-
ing can be achieved using program specialization, which enables concrete execution
on public data and symbolic execution on the sensitive data [Wang et al. 2009b]. This
protocol takes advantage of the fact that genomic computations can be partitioned into
computation on public data and private data, exploiting the fact that 99.5% of the
genomes of any two individuals are similar.
Moreover, genome sequences can be transformed into sets of offsets of different nu-
cleotides in the sequence to efficiently compute similarity scores (e.g., Smith-Waterman
computations) on outsourced distributed platforms (e.g., volunteer systems). Similar
sequences have similar offsets, which provides sufficient accuracy, and many-to-one
transformations provide privacy [Szajda et al. 2006]. Although this approach does not
provide provable security, it does not leak significant useful information about the
original sequences.
Until this point, all sequence comparison methods we have discussed work on com-
plete genomic sequences. Compressed DNA data (i.e., the variants) can be compared
using a novel data structure called Privacy-Enhanced Invertible BloomFilter [Eppstein
et al. 2011]. This method provides communication-efficient comparison schemes.
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Person-level genome sequence records. Person-level genome sequence records contrast
with the previous methods, which obscure sequences and report on aggregated data
rather than that of a single person. Several techniques have been proposed for enabling
privacy for person-level genome sequences. For instance, SNPs from several genomic
regions can be generalized into more general concepts: for example, transition (change
of A↔G or T↔C.), transversion (change of A↔C, A↔T, C↔G, or G↔T), and exact
SNP positions into approximate positions) [Lin et al. 2002]. This generalization makes
re-identification of an individual sequence difficult according to a prescribed level of
protection. In particular, k-anonymity can be used to generalize the genomic sequences
such that a sequence is indistinguishable from at least other k − 1 sequences. Also,
the problem of SNP anonymization can be expanded to more complex variations of a
genome using multiple sequence alignment and clustering methods [Malin 2005b; Li
et al. 2012]. However, such methods are limited in that they only work when there are
a large number of sequences with relatively small number of variations.
Given the limitations of generalization-based strategies, it has been suggested that
cryptographic techniques might be more appropriate for maintaining data utility. In
particular, it has been shown that additive homomorphic encryption can be used to
share encrypted data while still retaining the ability to compute a limited set of queries
(e.g., secure frequency count queries, which are useful to many analytical methods for
genomic data) [Kantarcioglu et al. 2008]. Yet, this method leaks information in that it
reveals the positions of the SNPs, which in turn reveals the type of test being conducted
on the data. Moreover, privacy in this protocol comes at a high cost of computation.
Cryptographic hardware at the remote site can be used as a trusted computation
base (TCB) to design a framework in which all person-level biomedical data is stored
at a central remote server in encrypted form [Canim et al. 2012]. The server can
compute over the genomic data from a large number of people in a privacy-preserving
fashion. This enables researchers to compute on shared data without sharing person-
level genomic data. This approach is efficient for typical biomedical computations;
however, it is limited in that trusted hardware tends to have relatively small memory
capacities, which dictate the need for load-balancing mechanisms.
Sequence alignment. Sequence alignment is fundamental to genome sequencing. The
increase in the quantity of sequencing data is growing at a faster rate than the decreas-
ing cost of computational power, thus the delegation of read mapping to the cloud can
be very beneficial. However, such delegation can have major privacy implications. Chen
et al. [2012] have shown that read mapping can be delegated to the public cloud in a
privacy-preserving manner using a hybrid cloud-based approach. They exploit the fact
that a sequence of a small number of nucleotides (≈20) is unique and two sequences
of equal length with edit distance of x, when divided into x + 1 segments will have at
least one matching segment. Based on this fact, computation is divided into two parts:
(i) the public part is delegated to the public cloud, in which the public cloud finds exact
matches on encrypted data and returns a small number of matches to the private cloud,
whereas (ii) the private part takes place in a private cloud, which computes the edit
distance using only the matches returned by the public cloud. This approach reduces
the local computation by a factor of 30 by delegating 98% of the work to the public cloud.
7.3. Legal and Forensic
Paternity testing. Paternity testing determines whether a certain male individual is the
father of another individual. It is based on the high similarity between the genomes
of a father and child (99.9%) in comparison to two unrelated human beings (99.5%).
It is not known exactly which 0.5% of the human genome is different between two
humans, but a properly chosen 1% sample of the genome can determine paternity with
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 48, No. 1, Article 6, Publication date: August 2015.
6:22 M. Naveed et al.
high accuracy [Gibbs and Singleton 2006]. Participants may want to compute the test
without sharing any information about their genomes.
Once genomes of both individuals are sequenced, a privacy-preserving paternity test
can be carried out using PSI-Cardinality (PSI-CA), for which inputs to PSI-CA protocol
are the sets of nucleotides comprising the genome. The size of the human genome, or
even 1% of it, cannot be handled by current PSI and other SMC protocols. However,
by exploiting domain knowledge, the computation time can be reduced to 6.8ms and
network bandwidth usage to 6.5KB by emulating the Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphism (RFLP) chemical test in software, which reduces the problem to finding
the intersection between two sets of size 25 [Baldi et al. 2011]. Subsequent work
demonstrates a framework for conducing such tests on an Android smartphone [De
Cristofaro et al. 2012]. Since the ideal output of the privacy-preserving paternity test
should be yes or no, it cannot be obtained using custom PSI protocols, whereas generic
garbled circuit–based protocols can be easily modified to add this capability [Huang
et al. 2011, 2012]. He et al. [2014]; Hormozdiari et al. [2014] propose cryptographic
protocols for identifying blood relatives.
Criminal forensics. Criminal forensic rules enable law enforcement agencies to have
unlimited access to the complete DNA record database of millions of individuals, usu-
ally of convicted criminals (e.g., CODIS12 in the United States). The motivation behind
creating such a database is to find a record that matches the DNA evidence from a
crime scene. Yet, providing unlimited access to law enforcement agencies is unneces-
sary andmay open the system to abuse. Cryptographic approaches have been developed
to preserve the privacy of the records that fail to match the evidence from the crime
scene [Bohannon et al. 2000]. Specifically, DNA records can be encrypted using a key
that depends on certain tests, such that when DNA is collected from a crime scene, the
scheme will only allow decryption of the records that match the evidence.
Finally, partial homomorphic encryption can be used for privacy-preservingmatching
of Short Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA profiles in an honest-but-curious model [Bruekers
et al. 2008]. Such protocols (described in Section 7.4) are useful for identity, paternity,
ancestry, and forensic tests.
7.4. Direct-to-Consumer (DTC)
Many DTC companies provide genealogy and ancestry testing. Cryptographic schemes
can be used to conduct these tests in a privacy-preserving fashion. Partial homomorphic
encryption can be cleverly used on STR profiles of individuals to conduct (i) common
ancestor testing based on the Y chromosome, (ii) paternity test with one parent, (iii) pa-
ternity test with two parents, and (iv) identity testing [Bruekers et al. 2008].
Despite the increasing use of DTC genome applications, less focus has been given to
the security and privacy of this domain. In particular, genomic data aggregation issues
require special attention because some companies allow people to publish high-density
SNP profiles online in combination with demographic and phenotypic data.
Focusing on kin genome privacy, Humbert et al. [2014] build a protection mechanism
against the kinship attack [Humbert et al. 2013] that uses DTC genomic data from
openSNP [Greshake et al. 2014]. Themain focus of the work is to find a balance between
the utility and privacy of genomic data. Every family member has a privacy constraint
to protect. At the same time, some family members want to publish (part of) their
genomes mainly to facilitate genomic research. The paper proposes a multidimensional
optimization mechanism in which the privacy constraints of the family members are
12Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), The Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis.
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protected and at the same time the utility (amount of genomic data published by the
family members) is maximized.
8. CHALLENGES FOR GENOME PRIVACY
While the value of genome sequencing in routine care has yet to be fully demonstrated,
it is anticipated that the plummeting cost and commoditization of these analyses will
change the practice of medicine. Data confidentiality and individual privacy will be
central to the acceptance and widespread usage of genomic information by health care
systems. However, a clear demonstration of the clinical usefulness of genomics is first
needed for doctors and other health care providers to fully embrace genomics and
privacy.
8.1. Consumer-driven Genomics
An unprecedented aspect of contemporary genomics that comes with its own set of
issues for data confidentiality is democratization, including facilitated access to large-
scale personal health-related data. Whereas medical and genetic information used
to be obtainable only through hospital or research laboratories, people can now ac-
cess their own genotyping or sequencing results through DTC companies such as
23andMe, as discussed before. On the research side, numerous participant-centric ini-
tiatives have recently been launched (notably by citizens’ networks such as openSNP
[Greshake et al. 2014] and the Personal Genome Project). As a result, genomic data are
increasingly found outside the controlled cocoon of health care systems or research. In
particular, individual genetic results or aggregated datasets are available on the In-
ternet, often with nonexistent or minimal protection. On one hand, these crowd-based
initiatives are very exciting, because they have the potential to stimulate biomedical
research, accelerate discoveries, and empower individuals. On the other hand, they
raise a number of concerns about potential privacy risks (as highlighted in Section 9).
For example, privacy risks must be assessed in the context of the extensive nature
of information available on the Internet (including online social networks), not only
within the narrower confines of genomic research or clinical care delivery.
8.2. Privacy and the Benefits of Genomic Data
It is important to note that both a lack of and excess of privacy have the potential to
derail the expected benefits of genomics in health care and research. On one hand, the
efficient and secure handling of individual genotype and sequence data will be central
to the implementation of genomic medicine. The Hippocratic Oath13 remains a pillar
of medical deontology and one of the few stable concepts in the highly tumultuous
history of medical practice. The Hippocratic Oath contains a clear statement about
the patient’s privacy. Trust is at the core of any successful health care system: any
leakage of highly sensitive genomic information may raise concerns and opposition in
the population and among political decision makers. Earning and conserving trust is
essential for hospitals and private companies that deal with genomics. As a result,
there is a potential for a service industry securing genomic data, either by providing ad
hoc solutions or by fully supporting storage and delivery of raw/interpreted sequence
information. Fortunately, as detailed in Section 7, there exist a variety of tools that can
mitigate the problem.
On the other hand, an excess of privacy-related hurdles could slow down research
and interfere with large-scale adoption of genomics in clinical practice. When designing
privacy-preserving solutions for genomic data, security and privacy researchers should
13See http://guides.library.jhu.edu/content.php?pid=23699&sid=190964 for a modern version of the Hippo-
cratic Oath.
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keep in mind that most end-users are not familiar with computer science and are
almost exclusively interested in the clinical utility of test results. Education is again a
fundamental requirement for privacy protection. However, in bioinformatics curricula,
students are trained to maximize the information to be extracted from (biological)
data. Usually, such curricula do not address security and privacy concerns, because
adversarial scenarios are out of their scope. Conversely, computer scientists rarely
have formal training in biology, let alone genomics. But, they are trained in security,
notably because of the formidable challenge raised by the numerous vulnerabilities
of the Internet. Consequently, to properly address the concerns about genomic data
protection, there is a clear and strong potential of cross-fertilization between these two
disciplines.
8.3. Acceptable Utility vs. Privacy of Genomic Data
The balance between acceptable utility and privacy of genomic data needs to be con-
sidered in context.
Health care. Patient-level information must be as precise as possible. Because ge-
nomic data is used here to support clinical decisions, including in life-threatening
situations, any decrease in data accuracy must be avoided. Security of electronic med-
ical records and other health-related information is therefore most often guaranteed
through restricted access (e.g., intranet use, password and card identification) to un-
modified data. It is important to note, however, that genetic testing is typically not
urgent, and that privacy-preserving measures that would slightly delay a test result
could be tolerated.
Research. Research on complex trait genomics relies on large datasets on which
genotyping or sequencing association studies can be run. To gain statistical power
and detect meaningful associations, it is often necessary to merge many such studies
through meta-analyses that can include data from hundreds of thousands of individ-
uals. Due to nonuniform use of technological platforms, variation in time and place of
genotyping, and differences in analysis pipelines, some degree of noise is unavoidable.
An interesting avenue for research is here to empirically determine whether differ-
ential privacy strategies (e.g., Johnson and Shmatikov [2013]) can be applied without
compromising discovery.
Legal and forensics. DNA collection and search for similarity patterns in genomic
data are used in criminal investigations and for other legal purposes such as paternity
testing. The accuracy of any test result is here again an absolute requirement to avoid
legal prejudice. Extremely stringent data protection must also be ensured due to the
highly sensitive nature of such cases.
Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genomics. DTC companies providing individual genomic
data have a clear commercial incentive to protect customers’ privacy in order to main-
tain trust and attract new customers. For example, the 23andMe Web page states:
“Your personalized web account provides secure and easy access to your information,
with multiple levels of encryption and security protocols protecting your personal infor-
mation.” Of course, these measures are ineffective when individuals choose to unveil
their full identity online together with their genomic data, thereby putting their (and
their blood relatives’) genome privacy at risk, either knowingly (as in the case of Per-
sonal Genome Project participants) or out of naivety.
9. FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY-PRESERVING HANDLING OF GENOMIC DATA
In this section, we provide a general framework for security and privacy in the handling
of genomic data. The framework is illustrated in Figure 9. As has been done throughout
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Fig. 9. Genomic data handling framework: DNA is extracted from an individual’s tissue or cells. DNA is
digitized either using sequencing (to obtain Whole Genome Sequence (WGS) or Whole Exome Sequence
(WES)) or genotyping (to obtain variants, usually only SNPs). Reads obtained from sequencing are aligned
to form the complete genome, while genotyped variants are digitized from the microchip array directly. Read
data may be stored for later analysis. The aligned genome can be stored in either raw form or compressed
form (variations from a reference human genome). Medical tests and other types of computation shown in the
figure can be performed either on raw aligned genome or just on variants. Possible outputs of computation
are shown. Output depends on the type of computation; in some cases, there is no output. The figure shows
the genomic data aggregation problem caused by recreational genomics services. The figure is divided into
three sections based on fundamental limitations of legal and technical measures for the protection of genomic
data. Legal protection is required for the left section and legal as well as technical protection is required for
the middle section, while, in theory, technical solutions would suffice for the protection of the right section.
The legend shows which blocks are associated with different uses of genomic data. We use the word “patient”
in this article to mean someone whose genome is sequenced or genotyped and not necessarily a person who is
ill.
this article, we divide the framework into four categories: (i) health care, (ii) research,
(iii) legal and forensics, and (iv) DTC genomics. This classification is based on the most
popular uses of genomic data; however, we recognize that the boundaries between these
categories are blurred and there is significant overlap. For each of these we describe
setting, threat model, and solutions and open problems. The setting provides the most
general environment around the problem (e.g., we do not discuss the possibility of
outsourcing the computation as one can easily extend our setting to another one in-
volving a third party). In this section, we assume that the adversary is computationally
bounded. We further assume that the adversary can leverage all publicly available in-
formation (e.g., data from the 1000 Genomes Project or public genealogy databases) to
one’s advantage. Moreover, in some cases, the adversary might have access to private
data. For instance, people can abuse their access to private data, an adversary can also
steal the data, and data can be extracted from a lost laptop.
9.1. Biospecimen
DNA is obtained in chemical form and then digitized. This cyber-physical nature of
DNA creates unique challenges for its protection.
9.1.1. Threat Model. In our threat model, the adversary is capable of (i) obtaining DNA
from an individual’s biological cells either voluntarily (e.g., for research with informed
consent) or involuntarily (e.g., leftover hairs or saliva on a coffee cup); (ii) sequencing
or genotyping the DNA from a biospecimen; (iii) interpreting the sequenced data to
learn identity, disease, kinship, and any other sensitive information; and (iv) linking
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the genomic data (or biospecimen) to the identity, health record, or any arbitrary
background information about the individual.
9.1.2. Solutions and Open Problems. Legal protection is necessary to protect the biospec-
imen and the DNA (in its chemical form). However, a solution to this problem is a
subject of public policy and is outside the scope of this article.
9.2. Digitization: Sequencing/Genotyping
9.2.1. Setting. A biospecimen is obtained by an agency (e.g., hospital) and is sequenced
or genotyped either by the same agency or by an external agency (e.g., Illumina,
23andMe, and the like).
9.2.2. Threat Model. Since a biospecimen is required for digitization, we assume the
threat model discussed in Section 9.1.1 with the following extensions: (i) the adversary
has full control over the entire sequencing or genotyping infrastructure, (ii) the ad-
versary can be honest-but-curious and can attempt to learn partial or entire genomic
data or any information derived from the genomic data, and (iii) the adversary can be
malicious and can compromise the integrity of partial or entire genomic data.
9.2.3. Solutions and Open Problems. Given the cyber-physical nature of DNA, it is not
possible to address this issue with technical measures alone. Both legal and techni-
cal protections are required to protect against this threat. An external agency cannot
derive genomic data without a biospecimen, and legal protection is required to pre-
vent misuse. Sequencing machines are expensive and are manufactured by a limited
number of companies. We envision a well-regulated process for the manufacturing, pro-
curement, and use of sequencing machines and government regulations in place for it.
The FDA already regulates the manufacturing of medical devices14 [Cheng 2003]. Reg-
ular inspections would check for compliance. Under such legal protections, sequencing
machines could have a tamper-resistant TCB that could output encrypted data such
that the sequencing agency could not access the plaintext genomic data.
9.3. Storage
We assume that once the adversary has access to the read data, it is easy to get raw
aligned data and variant data, hence we present storage of all three forms of data
together.
9.3.1. Setting. Genomic data can be stored by the patient15, health care organization
(e.g., as part of patient’s EHR), or a third party.
9.3.2. Threat Model. For all settings, we assume that the lifetime of genomic data is
much longer than the lifetime of a cryptographic algorithm. We consider the following
threat models.
Patient: Storage media or the device storing genomic data can be lost, stolen, or tem-
porarily accessed. A patient’s computer can be attacked by an adversary (curious or
malicious) to compromise confidentiality and/or integrity of the genomic data. We fur-
ther assume that an adversary can associate the identity and background information
(including phenotype information) from any arbitrary source. We also assume that the
adversary can use the compromised genomic data for any arbitrary purpose.
Hospital: We consider all of the threats described for the patient and the following
additional threats. An insider (or hacker) has full access to the infrastructure and
14http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postmarketrequirements/qualitysystems
regulations/.
15We use theword patient tomean an individual whose genome is sequenced or genotyped and not necessarily
a person who is ill.
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can link genomic information to the phenotypic information in the patient’s health
record.16 We also consider the threat of the health care organization communicating
incidental findings that are harmful – violating the right not to know.17 We assume that
the adversary can intentionally try to figure out variants of regions of the genome from
variants in other regions, e.g., to learn some sensitive SNPs that are removed to prevent
incidental finding issues. We also assume that a health care organization could illegally
collude with insurance agencies to facilitate discrimination based on genomic data.
Third party:We consider all of the threats discussed for the hospital and the following
additional threat. The adversary, as the third party itself, can be interested in de-
anonymizing the anonymized genomic data or aggregate genomic data.
9.3.3. Solutions and Open Problems. We report some solutions in Section 7. Users are
generally not equipped with skills and equipment to protect the security and privacy of
their genomic data. For the storage of genomic data, an option is to store it on a cloud
in an encrypted fashion, which makes the adversary’s job harder, as now it needs to
circumvent cloud storage security measures and is also required to hack into the user’s
computer to steal the decryption key. Efficient encryption schemes allowing secure
storage and computation are required.
9.4. Alignment/Assembly
As explained in Section 7, genomic data is obtained from the specimen in the form of
short reads. These short reads are then assembled using alignment or assembly algo-
rithms. Alignment is done by comparing the short reads to the reference genome, and
is computationally very intensive. Hence, it can be economically beneficial to delegate
the alignment to the cloud.
9.4.1. Setting. Short reads are obtained locally from the sequencingmachine and align-
ment is delegated to an untrusted third party.
9.4.2. Threat Model. We assume that the third party can be honest-but-curious, as well
as malicious, and can return incorrect results for economic or other malicious motives.
9.4.3. Solutions and Open Problems. We presented some solutions to this problem in
Section 7 [Chen et al. 2012]. However, there are several problemswith themost efficient
solution to date. First, it is not provably secure. Second, its security and efficiency
requires that the read size be greater than 100 nucleotides. Third, this scheme only
works in a hybrid cloud environment and requires local computation. Given that our
opinion poll (described in Section 5) shows that third-party environments are of the
greatest concern to biomedical researchers, a provably secure and efficient solution
that is capable of aligning the human genome in a cloud-computing environment is an
important open-research problem.
9.5. Interpretation
Interpretation depends on two private inputs: the patient’s genomic data and an in-
terpretation algorithm (possibly from more than one party). Given the complexity of
genomic data, it is unlikely that any single party will have a complete interpretation
algorithm. This makes the computation a multiparty process between independent
parties and the patient (or an agent of the patient, e.g., a hospital). Although each
party with a piece of the interpretation algorithm can compute independently with
16We assume that data stored at the hospital is not anonymized.
17For instance, a doctor telling a patient his increased susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease, when he does
not want to know. We emphasize that defining what is harmful is an ethical issue and is out of the scope of
this study.
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the patient, collusion of any two parties may leak information about another party’s
inputs. Moreover, the interpretation of one party may depend on the interpretation of
another party. We assume that all of these parties can be malicious and can collude
to learn information (e.g., the patient’s genomic data or another parties’ algorithm). In
some cases, it is necessary to sequence one’s parent to draw conclusions, in which case
parents might also be concerned about their privacy.
Personalized medicine is a special case of interpretation and depends on the patient’s
genomic data and disease markers (possibly distributed among multiple parties).
Preconception testing is another special case of interpretation. It is different from
personalized medicine because it is a prepregnancy test and measures can be taken to
conceive a healthy child (as evident from www.counsyl.com success stories). Addition-
ally, the outcome of the preconception test almost always depends on two people, each
of whom might prefer to not disclose their genomic status to the other.
9.5.1. Setting. The computation is typically performed on private data from multiple
parties. The parties involved in the computation are those who input their genomic
data and interpretation algorithms. The output of the computation should be released
only to the patient or authorized physician (possibly using the infrastructure of a health
care organization).
9.5.2. Threat Model. We assume that all parties can be honest-but-curious, malicious,
or colluding (and possibly all at the same time). They can use arbitrary background
knowledge to breach privacy. They may use falsified genomic data or a falsified inter-
pretation algorithm an arbitrary number of times to ascertain another parties’ private
inputs. Furthermore, they may influence the results in an arbitrary manner.
9.5.3. Solutions and Open Problems. We discussed some of the solutions for the per-
sonalized medicine scenario in Section 7. However, current solutions are limited to
privacy-preserving disease susceptibility tests. It is clear that computational solutions
that support a broad range of computation over genomic data are needed. At the same
time, the design of such systems must be practical and provide reasonable usability,
accuracy, security, and privacy.
9.6. Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS)
9.6.1. Setting. The genomic data from two groups of people are collected, one being the
case group (i.e., people with the disease or some other trait) and the other being the
control group (i.e., people without the disease). Statistical analysis is then conducted
to discover the correlation between the disease and genetic variants. The results are
subsequently published in research papers and posted online, possibly with restricted
access (e.g., at dbGaP18).
9.6.2. Threat Model. An adversary may wish to determine if the victim is a GWAS
participant or blood relative of a GWAS participant. We assume that the adversary has
access to the high-density SNP profile of the victim and also to a reference population
(which can be obtained from the same GWAS conducted on a different population). The
attack succeeds if the adversary learns information from the data produced by GWAS,
which the adversary otherwise would not have learned.
9.6.3. Solutions and Open Problems. There are various solutions that could be applied
in this setting. We explained noise-based solutions, such as differential privacy, in
Section 7.2. Yet, differential privacy-based solutions make data more noisy, which
makes adoption of these approaches difficult. This is particularly problematic because
18http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap.
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biomedical researchers and physicians want more (not less) accurate data than is
available today. An ideal solution should preserve the utility of data while preserving
the privacy of participants. We believe that more research is required in this area to
determine if noise-based approaches can lead to more usable and pragmatic data publi-
cations. These approaches may, for instance, build on well-established sets of practices
from other communities. For example, the Federal Committee on Statistical Methodol-
ogy (FCSM) has a long history of sharing information in a privacy-preserving manner.
These practices obey multilevel access principles and, to the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, no significant privacy breach from such a domain has been reported.
While the data disclosed by federal agencies is quite different from high-dimensional
genomic data, it might be possible to adapt these practices to balance the benefits
and harms caused by public sharing of aggregate genomic data. These strategies may
be composed of social and technical protections. From a social perspective, a popular
method to mitigate risk is through contractual agreements that prohibit the misuse of
such data. Such contracts could be complemented by cryptographic protocols that help
preserve the privacy of the participants, particularly in settings in which the data is
used in secure computation and only the output of the computation is revealed to a
specific party.
9.7. Data Sharing
The majority of genome–phenome discoveries come from very large populations, some-
times on the order of millions of participants. Given the costs and scarcity of such
resources, sharing data would fuel biomedical research. However, sharing this data
entails privacy implications, as discussed earlier.
It should be noted that individual-level genomic data from a large number of people
is needed to conduct genome–phenome studies (e.g., GWAS). Moreover, the results of a
typical GWAS are published as aggregate genomic data, which is usually made avail-
able to researchers at large (e.g., NIH requires results of all NIH-sponsored GWASs
to be uploaded to dbGaP and published in research papers—e.g., p-values of relevant
SNPs). Therefore, we focus only on the sharing of individual-level genomic data here.
9.7.1. Setting. Genomic data needs to be shared among different research institutions,
possibly under different jurisdictions. Privacy-preserving solutions can be built in the
following settings: (i) all data delegated to and computation done on a trusted party
(e.g., a governmental entity), (ii) all data delegated to and computation done on an
untrusted party, (iii) all data stored at and computation done at the collection agency,
(iv) sharing data using data use agreements, and (v) sharing anonymized data.
9.7.2. Threat Model. We assume that data is being shared between untrusted parties.
The parties with whom data is being shared may want to use it for any arbitrary
purpose, including using it for participant re-identification, or for finding disease sus-
ceptibility of the patients or their blood relatives.
9.7.3. Solutions and Open Problems. We described some solutions in Section 7.2. How-
ever, these solutions do not allow for arbitrary computations on encrypted data. Theo-
retically, many cryptographic solutions exist to solve this problem. For example, FHE
can be used to encrypt the data and arbitrary computations can be done on it while
preserving privacy, but data needs to be decrypted by the party that encrypted the
data. Functional encryption (FE) could also be used, which allows computation on en-
crypted data and produces plaintext directly. However, FHE and FE are not sufficiently
efficient to be practically useful. The performance of FHE and FE is progressing and
these schemes might be usable in the future to support data sharing. Clearly, though,
specialized efficient solutions for exploiting the nature of genomic data are needed to
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support specific analytics. C-FE [Naveed et al. 2014] described earlier is a promising
approach for developing practical solutions.
9.8. Paternity
Genomic data is extensively used to determine parentage, and test results are admissi-
ble in courts of law. Today, the biospecimen of the individuals involved in the tests are
outsourced to a third party in the form of cheek swabs, where the DNA is extracted.
Sending one’s DNA to a third party could have serious implications for one’s privacy.
9.8.1. Setting. Two parties each have their sequenced genome or genotyped variants
and one party wants to know whether the other party is the parent.
9.8.2. Threat Model. The threat model in this case is the standard model defined for
secure two-party computations. We assume that parties can be honest-but-curious or
malicious.
9.8.3. Solutions and Open Problems. In Section 7, we explain some of the solutions to the
problem. A chemical test – RFLP – can be simulated for a neat and efficient privacy-
preserving solution, given that genomes are stored by individuals themselves [Baldi
et al. 2011]. Yao’s garbled circuits can be used instead of PSI to output a binary answer
(YES or NO) instead of the number of matched segments in a simulated RFLP test,
and therefore reveals the minimum amount of information.
9.9. Forensic DNA Databases
Many countries maintain a huge database of DNA profiles of convicted (and, in some
cases, accused) criminals. Law enforcement agencies usually have unlimited access to
such a resource, which makes it vulnerable to abuse. It is possible that in the near
future, instead of concise DNA profiles, law enforcement agencies will be able to have
access to full genome sequences of individuals, which further exacerbates the issue.
9.9.1. Setting. Police officers collect DNA samples from a crime scene. Then, they want
to check whether an individual with the same DNA profile/sequence is present in the
DNA records database.
9.9.2. Threat Model. We assume that the adversary can be honest-but-curious, inter-
ested in learning about other people in the database. In addition, the adversary can
be malicious. If the adversary has write access to the database, the individual can also
try to compromise the integrity of the record(s) in the database. We also assume that
the adversary is able to affect the outcome of a query in an arbitrary manner.
9.9.3. Solutions and Open Problems. We discussed some of the existing solutions to this
problem in Section 7. Theoretically, this problem differs from interpretation and other
types of computation, as the privacy for query is not required; only the privacy of
the individuals other than the suspect is of concern here. This makes the problem
more tractable, possibly making solutions scalable to large databases with millions of
records.
9.10. Recreational Genomics
Several commercial companies offer DTC genomics services. They include kinship,
ancestry, and partner compatibility testing.
9.10.1. Setting. The customer ships one’s specimen (usually saliva) to a company. This
specimen is used to genotype typically one million SNPs; the data is then digitized
and stored in digital form on the server. Some computation is done on this data for
ancestry, disease susceptibility, kinship, or other tests. The data and the results are
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then available for the user to download or see through a browser. Some companies (e.g.,
23andMe) allow users to search for people with common ancestors, for example, third,
fourth or fifth cousins.
9.10.2. Threat Model. We assume the threat models for specimen collection, digitiza-
tion, and interpretation. There are also new threats. The owner of the data posts one’s
data online along with identity and some phenotypical data, as done, for example, on
openSNP [Greshake et al. 2014]. We assume that the data owner makes an informed
decision, willingly forfeiting genome privacy. The major threat then is to the blood
relatives of the data owner, whose private information is also leaked.
Genomic data aggregation is another issue caused by users posting their genomic
data online. This data can be aggregated by companies and then used for commercial or
other purposes. It is worth noting that some genome-sharing Web sites have achieve-
ment programs for which users get rewards whenever they post their phenotype data
(e.g., hair color, eye color, disease predisposition, and so on). Genomic data combined
with phenotypic data is much more valuable than genomic data alone.
9.10.3. Solutions and Open Problems. All other solutions apply here; however, recre-
ational genomics presents new problems of public sharing and genomic data aggre-
gation. We emphasize that public awareness is required to enable people to make an
informed decision to share their genomic data publicly because such sharing compro-
mises their own and their relatives’ privacy. It should be made clear that in the case
of abuse of this publicly available data, people would be discouraged to share genomic
data even for legitimate research purposes. However, this is a policy and ethics debate
and is out of scope of this article.
Conclusion
The confluence of cheap computing and high-throughput sequencing technologies is
making genomic data increasingly easy to collect, store, and process. At the same time,
genomic data is being integrated into a wide range of applications in diverse settings
(e.g., health care, research, forensics, DTC), such that privacy and security issues
have yet to be sufficiently defined and addressed. For instance, massive computation
capability is needed to analyze genomic data for research purposes, such that the cloud
is likely to play a large role in the management of such data. At the same time, genomic
data will be used in specific applications (e.g., forensics) for which mobile computing
environments (e.g., tablets and smartphones) will be routinely used to access those
data. Genomic data will also be increasingly available on the Web, especially in citizen-
contributed environments, (e.g., online social networks). While some individuals are
sharing such information, there are significant privacy concerns because it is unknown
what such information is capable of revealing, or how it will be used in the future.
As such, there is a clear need to support personalized medicine, genomic research,
forensic investigation, and recreational genomics while respecting privacy. Computing
is a crucial enabler, but can also be the first source of leakage if appropriate mecha-
nisms are not put in place. Our survey (opinion poll from the biomedical community)
provides some insight into what may be the most important aspects of the problem
to study. Along these lines, we have provided a review of the state-of-the-art regard-
ing computational protection methods in this field, as well as the main challenges
moving forward. To assist the data privacy and security community to develop mean-
ingful solutions, we have provided a framework to facilitate the understanding of the
privacy-preserving handling of genomic data.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide additional results from our expert opinion poll discussed
in Section 5. Results shown here are stratified according to the security/privacy and
genetics/genomics expertise of the participants. Results for the cases for which the
number of participants was small are omitted.
Fig. 10. Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes are
described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means that the respondent does not agree with any of the probes.
Only “expert” biomedical participants (sample size 23).
Fig. 11. Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes are
described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means that the respondent does not agree with any of the probes.
Only “knowledgable” biomedical participants (sample size 28).
Fig. 12. Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes are
described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means that the respondent does not agree with any of the probes.
Only “some familiarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
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Fig. 13. Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes are
described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means that the respondent does not agree with any of the probes.
Only “knowledgable” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
Fig. 14. Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes are
described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means that the respondent does not agree with any of the probes.
Only “some familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
Fig. 15. Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes are
described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means that the respondent does not agree with any of the probes:
Only “no familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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Fig. 16. Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community. Only “expert”
biomedical participants (sample size 23).
Fig. 17. Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community. Only “Knowl-
edgable” biomedical participants (sample size 28).
Fig. 18. Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community. Only “some
familiarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
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Fig. 19. Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community. Only “knowl-
edgable” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
Fig. 20. Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community. Only “some
familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
Fig. 21. Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community. Only “no famil-
iarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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Fig. 22. Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? Only “expert”
biomedical participants (sample size 23).
Fig. 23. Response to the question:Would you publicly share your genome on the Web?Only “knowledgable”
biomedical participants (sample size 28).
Fig. 24. Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? Only “some famil-
iarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
Fig. 25. Response to the question:Would you publicly share your genome on the Web?Only “knowledgable”
security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
Fig. 26. Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? Only “some famil-
iarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
Fig. 27. Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web?Only “no familiarity”
security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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Fig. 28. Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information about
his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? Only “expert”
biomedical participants (sample size 23).
Fig. 29. Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? Only
“knowledgable” biomedical participants (sample size 28).
Fig. 30. Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information about
his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? Only “some
familiarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
Fig. 31. Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data?: Only
“knowledgable” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
Fig. 32. Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information about
his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? Only “some
familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Fig. 33. Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information about
his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? Only “no
familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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